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Abstract
This article describes the design of knowledge and skill-based pay
systems for K-12 teachers in six U.S. school districts and one charter
school. Based on a theory of action that relates knowledge and skill-
based pay systems to improvements in instruction, and the expectancy
theory of motivation, seven dimensions for comparison are identified and
the systems are compared based on these dimensions. While there were a
variety of reasons for designing new pay systems, similarities included
that teachers were involved in the design processes, and that the
knowledge and skills rewarded are more closely related to instruction
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than in the traditional salary schedule (though none of the systems placed
heavy emphasis on content-specific pedagogy). Most systems made use
of existing standards or definitions of good teaching, such as the
Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 1996). While most of the systems
involved performance-based assessments of teacher skills, in no case
were seniority and graduate degrees eliminated as a basis for pay
progression. Few of the programs had developed a coordinated
professional development program specifically linked to the knowledge
and skills rewarded by the new pay system. Implications for policy
makers and system designers are drawn. 
Introduction
A number of lines of research (e.g. National Commission on Teaching and America's
Future, 1996; Slavin and Fashola, 1998; Wright, Horn, and Sanders, 1997; Bembry et al,
1998; Ferguson and Ladd, 1996) have identified teacher instructional capacity as a key
variable in the success of educational reforms in improving student achievement. For the
past two years, the CPRE Teacher Compensation Project has been studying a new form
of teacher compensation that may have the potential to support improvements in the
capacity of teachers to deliver instruction that would enable all children to achieve to
high academic standards, as well as to respond to the growing public concern that there
be some link between teacher salaries and teacher performance. This innovation,
knowledge and skill-based pay, rewards teachers with base pay increases and/or bonuses
for acquiring and demonstrating specific knowledge and skills needed to meet
educational goals, such as improving student achievement. The application of this pay
concept to K-12 education has been suggested by Conley and Odden (1995), Mohrman,
Morhman and Odden (1996), and Odden and Kelley (1997). This article reports on a
study of seven knowledge and skill-based pay systems for teachers that have been
developed by U.S. schools or districts.
Knowledge and skill-based pay can be better understood by contrasting it with two other
teacher pay systems. Unlike the traditional single salary schedule, on which teachers
progress through the salary schedule based on the number of years of service and the
additional degrees or college credits they acquire, knowledge and skill-based systems
provide pay increases when teachers demonstrate, usually though some form of
performance assessment, that they have acquired and can apply classroom-relevant
knowledge and skills. Ideally, pay progression is based on mastering a sequence or of
knowledge and skills that represent higher levels of expertise or higher levels of teaching
practice. The intent of knowledge and skill- based pay is to supplement or replace the
traditional schedule with a pay system that motivates teachers to acquire and
demonstrate the application of knowledge and skills that more directly contribute to
better school performance and student achievement. The importance of seniority as a
basis for pay is reduced or even eliminated. 
The other contrast is with merit pay programs. Merit pay typically involves providing
individual teachers with base pay increases by allotting a fixed fund of money based on
administrators' subjective judgments of teacher performance during the prior year. While
knowledge and skill-based pay programs also reward individual teachers, the reward is
based on demonstrating knowledge and skills with respect to public, relatively detailed
standards or descriptions of practice. These standards both guide assessor judgments and
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make known to teachers 'up front' what they need to do to demonstrate the knowledge
and skills. Since any teacher who demonstrates the skills receives the reward, teachers
do not compete for a share of a fixed fund or merit pay pool. These features of
knowledge and skill-based pay may make it more effective in motivating more teachers
than merit pay.
Because knowledge and skill-based pay programs are new and quite rare in the K-12
sector, it is not yet possible to obtain definitive evidence about the success of these
programs in influencing instructional capacity or in improving student achievement.
This article therefore concentrates on describing and comparing seven pioneer
knowledge and skill-based pay programs. To do so, a set of dimensions were derived
from an explicit theory of action which links knowledge and skill-based pay to
improvements in instructional capacity and student achievement, and from the literature
on knowledge and skill- based pay in the private sector.
The Theory of Action for Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay
Knowledge and skill-based pay systems have the potential to positively impact
instructional capacity, and in turn student achievement, in three ways. First, they provide
incentives for teachers to develop specific knowledge and skills needed to increase
instructional capacity. More highly skilled teachers, in turn, have the capacity to deliver
higher quality instruction, which, when combined with motivation to improve
instruction and a context conducive to applying the skills, should lead to improved
instruction. Second, by allocating higher pay to teachers who have these skills, these
programs should help attract and retain high capacity teachers, and by denying higher
pay to teachers without the skills, discourage lower capacity teachers from staying. Over
time, the average skill level of a faculty should increase, improving the average quality
of instruction. Third, a well-developed knowledge and skill-based pay systems rests on a
model of competence that can also be used in teacher evaluation, professional
development, and even recruitment and selection. To the extent this model informs these
human resource management functions, the organization communicates and reinforces a
normative vision of quality instruction. This model can also be used by teachers as a
guide to professional development activities, a framework for self-reflection and
self-evaluation, and a vocabulary for the discussion of teaching practice. Over time a
shared conception of quality instruction should develop that supports teacher skill
seeking and efforts to improve practice. This in turn contributes to improved student
achievement. Figure 1 below summarizes this "theory of action" for knowledge and
skill-based pay.
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Figure 1. Theory of Action for Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay
The most important process by which knowledge and skill-based pay is expected to
function to improve instructional capacity is by providing a pay incentive for knowledge
and skill acquisition. However, simply offering teachers a pay increase or bonus will not
necessarily motivate them to acquire the needed skills. We have used a modified version
of Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) to develop a model to identify what a knowledge
and skill based pay program needs to do in order to motivate skill acquisition (see Figure
2).
Figure 2. Motivational Model for Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay Based on
Expectancy Theory 
This model suggests that in order for knowledge and skill-based pay to motivate effort
toward skill acquisition, teachers must first believe that it is likely that if they put forth
the effort, they can actually acquire the specified knowledge and skills. This is called the
expectancy perception, and is symbolized by the arrow running from effort to knowledge
and skill acquisition in Figure 2. This perception is influenced by several factors,
including the teacher's sense of self-efficacy for acquiring the skills and conditions the
organization can more easily influence, including the degree to which the teacher
understands what knowledge and skills are required and how they are to be
demonstrated, the perceived degree of peer and administrator support for developing the
skills, and the perceived availability of opportunities to develop the skills (such as
high-quality professional development). To the extent that the teacher understands the
skill requirements, believes that peers and administrators support their acquisition, and
believes there are the required opportunities to develop the skills available, s/he will be
more likely to believe that if s/he tries, s/he will be able to acquire the skills.
Teachers must also believe that there is a strong connection between acquiring the skills
and positive consequences such as receiving the pay increase. This link is called the
instrumentality perception, and it reflects the common-sense idea that if teachers do not
believe that the reward is contingent on acquiring the skills, then the promised reward
won't motivate skill-seeking. This link is represented by the arrow from knowledge and
skill acquisition to consequences in Figure 2. In order for this perception to be strong,
teachers must believe that the promised pay increases will be provided when the skills
are demonstrated, and will not be provided when they are not. One set of conditions
likely to support this belief include a reliable source of funding for the pay increases and
the past performance of the organization in keeping promises to teachers. Another
condition is that the methods used to assess knowledge and skill acquisition be fair,
valid, and reliable. If teachers believe that favoritism or measurement error determines
how well one does on the assessment, rather than their true skill level, they will be less
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likely to expend effort to acquire the skills. If skill acquisition cannot be validly
measured, pay increases will be less contingent on skill acquisition, and when teachers
realize this, they will be less motivated to acquire the skills.
Acquiring and demonstrating the skills must also have consequences teachers value.
While it is safe to assume teachers value pay increases, these rewards also must be large
enough to be perceived as worth the effort expended to acquire the specified skills.
These rewards will also be more motivating if the knowledge and skill model on which
the program is based is accepted by teachers as consistent with their conceptions of
quality instruction and a highly-skilled teacher. Presumably, most teachers want to
consider themselves good at what they do and are interested in developing their skills
toward their ideal of a highly-skilled teacher. They may find this process of development
intrinsically rewarding. If the knowledge and skill model is contrary to this ideal,
teachers are presented with a choice: develop different skills and get more pay, or
develop skills consistent with the ideal and forgo the extra pay. The extrinsic and
intrinsic rewards work against each other. It is likely that the extrinsic pay reward will
have a more motivating effect if it is consistent with the intrinsic reward. This means
that the knowledge and skill model needs to be consistent with teachers' beliefs about
what constitutes of a highly-skilled teacher. Finally, teachers may also value avoiding
certain negative consequences, such as not being recognized as highly- skilled or expert.
Avoiding these may also be motivating, especially if the definition of "expert" is shared
by school-level peers.
Comparison Dimensions
Based on the theory of action, the motivational model, and the research and practitioner
literature on private sector knowledge and skill-based pay systems, seven dimensions
were developed to structure the analysis and comparison of the seven cases of
knowledge and skill- based pay we studied.
1. Impetus Or Motivation For Developing The Knowledge And Skill- Based Pay
Program
The theory of action assumes that policy makers choose to initiate these programs in
order to improve instruction and in turn to improve student achievement. Alternatively,
adoption of new forms of teacher compensation by pioneer organizations may be
motivated by the desire to appear innovative or by the desire of influential decision
makers to implement strongly-held ideas about which teachers should be paid more. In
addition, a pay system change can present an opportunity to further other agendas, such
as providing additional pay for all teachers or assuring the public that teacher pay is
related to teacher performance. The motivation for moving to knowledge and skill-based
pay is important, because it is likely to be related to design features such as the
knowledge and skills in the model and the extent to which the new pay structure departs
from the traditional salary schedule. One might expect that where the primary
motivation is to improve student achievement, the knowledge and skill model will focus
on instruction, and pay increases for developing instructional skills will be greater.
2. The Design Process
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The motivation model suggests that teachers' views of the fairness of various aspects of
the program and their acceptance of the model of good teaching implied by the
knowledge and skills rewarded will influence their motivation to acquire the knowledge
and skills. One way to promote the perceived fairness and acceptability of the system is
to have teachers participate in its design. The private sector prescriptive literature on
compensation program design (e.g. Lawler, 2000; Wilson and Phalon, 1996; Ledford,
1989) has advocated such employee participation. So did Odden and Kelley (1997) for
education. Participation is thought to increase the level of information employees have
about the program's rationale and operation. Employees also have valuable information
to share about what they value, how the program is likely to work in practice, and how
they are likely to react to it. Participation is also thought to increase "buy- in". Because a
high level of participation is likely to result in greater acceptability and perceived
fairness, an important facet of this dimension is the degree to which teachers participated
in the design of the program.
One form of teacher participation is through collective bargaining. However, it may be
difficult to design a knowledge and skill-based pay program through the standard
adversarial collective bargaining process of proposal and counter-proposal, with each
side seeking maximum advantage. Knowledge and skill-based pay programs require a
coherent design based on some agreed-upon conception of good teaching. Many
technical details, such as how knowledge and skills will be assessed, need to be
addressed. So it is expected that these programs would be designed either outside the
formal contract negotiation process or though an interest-based process (Fisher and Ury,
1981) that focuses the parties' attention on mutual goals.
Another important aspect of the design process is how program designers decide what
knowledge and skills to reward. Designers in the private sector appear to have used
inductive, deductive, or adaptive approaches. The inductive approach involves using job
analysis or relying on research to identify those knowledge and skills likely to contribute
to employee performance. One version of this method is to study known good and
average performers to find out what knowledge and skills differ between these groups
(Spencer and Spencer, 1993, American Compensation Association, 1996). The
deductive approach involves starting from the organization's strategy, then trying to
identify the knowledge and skill employees need to carry it out (Heneman and Thomas,
1997, American Compensation Association, 1996). The adaptive approach involves
starting with a knowledge and skill model developed elsewhere, then changing it to fit
local goals and conditions. Though the use of the adaptive method in the private sector
has been criticized because it does not provide a unique source of competitive advantage
(Ledford and Heneman, 2000; Zingheim, Ledford, and Schuster, 1996), it avoids
'reinventing the wheel', especially for those core knowledge and skills likely to be
common across organizations.
In the K-12 sector the core technology of instruction is similar across schools. Since
there is currently little competition among schools, there is little incentive for very
different specifications of knowledge and skills to be identified. There are also
economies of effort to be realized by adapting work already done by recognized bodies
of experts, such as the standards proposed by the Interstate New Teacher Assessment
and Support Consortium (1992), state teacher licensing standards, the National Board
for Professional Teaching Standards (1999)(NBPTS) standards, or the Danielson's
Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 1996). Thus we might expect that many of these
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pioneer knowledge and skill-based pay programs would have adapted external standards,
perhaps adding locally-important skills or modifying language to fit local conditions,
rather than attempting to develop an organization-specific model. This approach also
allows program designers to appeal to the authority of these external experts when
seeking support from teachers and the community.
3. Types and Structure of Knowledge And Skills Rewarded.
At the heart of a knowledge and skill-based pay program is the specification of the
knowledge and skills teachers will be rewarded for developing. The theory of action
assumes that the knowledge and skills specified will be those teachers need to deliver
instruction that contributes directly to student achievement. Thus an important facet of
this dimension is the degree to which the knowledge and skills rewarded are related to
instruction.
Another important facet is the extent to which the knowledge and skills rewarded are
organized into an integrated model with a defined continuum of skills or expertise.
Knowledge and skill-based pay programs in the private sector often structure the
knowledge and skills rewarded into a set of career levels (Jones, 1995; Daniels, 1997),
levels defined by rating scales (Heneman and Thomas, 1997; Gorsline, 1996; American
Compensation Association, 1996) or sequences of skills to be mastered (Gupta et al,
1986; Jenkins et al, 1992). Odden (2000) and Odden and Kelley (1997) sketched a
number of different structures of knowledge and skills representing a progression from
entry level to accomplished teaching. Such a structure could provide a roadmap for
teachers seeking to develop their knowledge and skills as well as convenient attachment
points for pay increases. It could also be used to align other parts of the human resource
management system, especially professional development programs, and as a guide for
teachers working to develop mastery of quality instruction.
4. How Knowledge And Skill Acquisition Is Assessed.
The motivational model suggests that knowledge and skills should be assessed in a way
that teachers see as fair and valid, and the theory of action implies that the assessment
method must ensure teachers can apply the skills in practice. The traditional degrees and
credits seem to be viewed as fair by teachers, but they may not have high validity as
indicators of whether skills can be applied in the classroom. Properly constructed and
administered, performance- based assessments, which function as samples of teachers'
instruction, have the potential to ensure that the skills can be applied and to be perceived
as valid and fair, due to their close connection with practice. Thus one facet of this
dimension is the extent to which performance-based assessments are used, rather than
degrees and credits, to provide evidence of knowledge and skill acquisition.
While private sector knowledge and skill-based pay programs typically appear to depend
on relatively simple, locally-developed assessments (Heneman and Ledford, 1998),
program designers in the K-12 sector have the option of using externally-developed
assessments, such as PRAXIS III (Dwyer, 1998), the Framework for Teaching
(Daniealson, 1996), or the NBPTS assessments. Thirty-one states and more than 200
districts provide some salary incentive for certification. (National Board, 2001). This
avoids the expense and effort of developing local assessments for core teacher skills that
are likely to be common across districts or schools (Milanowski, Odden, and Youngs,
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1998, Heneman and Ledford, 1998). External assessments may also have the potential
for greater validity and fairness than assessment developed locally, due to the greater
expertise and resources of their developers. External assessments could be used in
combination with local assessments to maintain the rigor of the system. The teacher
performance evaluation literature (e.g. Wise et al, 1984) suggests that local assessors
such as principals face many incentives to be less than rigorous. If almost all teachers are
judged to have the skills, due to leniency of local assessors, the contingency between
skill acquisition and receiving the reward the motivational model postulates as necessary
is reduced. (The reward won't motivate effort toward skill acquisition if the assessors
certify teachers without the skills as eligible for the reward.) Odden (2000) outlined a
model knowledge and skill-based pay structure that combined the use of external and
local assessments. So a second facet of this dimension is the extent to which external
and locally-developed assessments are used to provide evidence of knowledge and skill
acquisition.
5. The Size and Structure of the Knowledge and Skill Incentives.
The theory of action proposes that the extra pay offered will motivate teachers to acquire
the knowledge and skills needed to improve instruction. To motivate, the pay incentive
provided must be valued. Experience with the traditional salary schedule suggests that
teachers value pay rewards enough to collect years of seniority, credits, and degrees. But
to motivate the acquisition of the new, possibly hard-to- master skills needed to improve
instruction, the incentives must be of sufficient size to attract teachers' attention and to
be perceived as commensurate with the effort needed to acquire the skills. It is
reasonable to expect that the greater the size of the incentive, the more motivational
effect, all else equal. So an important facet of this dimension is the size of the incentive
offered.
To the extent that knowledge and skill rewards replace the traditional pay increases for
seniority and educational attainment, we might expect teachers to be more motivated to
attain the skills, since the traditional opportunities for pay increases have been reduced.
A more radical change in the pay structure, de-emphasizing seniority and educational
attainment unrelated to classroom instruction, sends a stronger signal that new
knowledge and skills are needed. Knowledge and skill pay programs might be located on
a continuum ranging from those that supplement the traditional salary schedule by
simply adding additional pay opportunities based on knowledge and skill acquisition, to
complete replacement of the traditional schedule's seniority steps and educational
attainment lanes with a set of pay levels based only on knowledge and skill attainment.
One might expect that the greater the perceived need to improve instruction, the more
the traditional salary schedule would be modified and the larger the incentives for
knowledge and skill acquisition would be.
A knowledge and skill-based pay system carries risks for teachers accustomed to
automatic pay increases based on seniority. It may be particularly unattractive to more
senior teachers because it places less emphasis on seniority as a criterion for pay
differentiation, and can require developing new skills, which may not be as good an
investment of effort for them. To get a knowledge and skill-based pay program accepted
may require some provision that compensates teachers in some way for the increased
risk or reduces the threat that the emphasis on new skills can represent to senior
teachers. Thus another feature of interest is whether the programs include provisions
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intended to make the new system acceptable to potential opponents such as veteran
teachers.
6. Alignment of Other Human Resource Programs in Support of the Knowledge
and Skill Model
Ensuring that the professional development programs available to teachers are aligned
with the knowledge and skill model is likely to be a determinant of program success,
because according to the motivational model, teachers need to perceive that
opportunities to acquire the rewarded skills are available in order to believe that their
efforts are likely to be successful. Private sector employers appear to take on the
responsibility for providing and communicating opportunities to acquire skills, to ensure
availability and to show employees their efforts to acquire skills are being supported
(American Compensation Association, 1996; Jenkins et al, 1992). Thus an important of
aspect of alignment is whether organizations provide professional development
opportunities linked to the knowledge and skills their pay systems reward.
A knowledge and skill model can also provide a foundation for other human resource
management programs such as performance evaluation, recruitment, and selection
(Spencer and Spencer, 1993, Schippman et al, 2000). The theory of action postulates that
a human resource management program aligned with the model will contribute to the
development of a shared conception of good instruction consistent with the model. If the
model is shared with job candidates during recruitment, those who do not believe that
they can develop the skills or are not in agreement with the underlying philosophy of
instruction may "self-select" out of the hiring process. Selecting new teachers based on
the knowledge and skill model helps to ensure those who are hired have the skills, or the
potential to develop them. If teachers select the district or school and the district or
school selects teachers based on the model, convergence on the conception of instruction
it embodies should increase over time. With respect to current staff, if teacher evaluation
is made consistent with the knowledge and skill model, this will avoid confusing
teachers about what it values as good teaching, and teachers will not be faced with two
unrelated assessments on which they must spend time and energy. Teachers should be
more likely to use the model to guide their own professional development efforts, and to
absorb the model as the appropriate way to think about teaching, again reinforcing a
share conception of instruction. Thus a second aspect of alignment is the extent to which
the knowledge and skill model is integrated with other human resource management
programs besides pay and professional development.
7. Costs and Funding 
While knowledge and skill-based pay offers substantial benefits, it is also likely to
require additional investments, including the costs of increased professional
development and additional administrative overhead (e.g. assessment and
record-keeping) as well as of higher salaries. Private sector experience with knowledge
and skill-based pay programs suggests that administrative costs increase and
per-employee salary costs increase. (Gupta et al, 1986; Jenkins et al, 1992 ). Individual
pay increases are thought to be offset by increases in productivity and greater flexibility
in staff utilization due to cross-training. However, these offsets are less likely to appear
in the K-12 sector because increased productivity, in the form of higher student
achievement, typically does not allow reductions in staff nor savings in materials or
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equipment. (Nor is it immediately marketable for increased revenue.) The knowledge
and skills are not those that allow teachers to do more different jobs, therefore allowing
elimination of support staff. Therefore in the long run we would expect higher costs,
which need to be funded by new money or reallocation of existing resources.
Case Selection, Data, and Method
The cases compared here include of six school districts and one charter school all of
which had adopted some form of knowledge and skill-based pay. The cases were
selected based on project researchers' knowledge of districts or schools designing and
implementing these pay programs, and a survey of state department of education and
teacher association staffs which asked them to identify districts with innovative pay
systems. These "early adopters" are not representative of U.S. schools or districts,
merely illustrative of the variety of knowledge and skill- based pay programs that are
being developed and of the process of design and implementation. Description and
comparison is based on the programs' operation or design as of the 1999-200 school
year. In each case, project staff visited the district or school, in some cases multiple
times, during the 1998-2000 period. Administrators, union officials, and in some
instances, teachers were interviewed. A semi-structured interview protocol guided most
of the interviews. Documents describing the program were also collected, and in some
cases internal research done by the districts to evaluate the programs was obtained. The
researcher who visited the site wrote a case description from which the information
relevant to the comparison dimensions was abstracted. The Appendix provides a brief
description of each case site. Extended case descriptions are available at
www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre. In a few cases, additional contacts were made by the author to
clarify information in the case descriptions. The author then summarized the features of
each case along the comparison dimensions, then attempted to identify patterns and
important differences, and to draw conclusions about the implications of the experiences
of these early adopters for research and program design.
Program Comparisons
The similarities and differences among the seven programs are presented below,
structured according to the seven comparison dimensions.
Motivation For Developing The Knowledge And Skill-Based Pay Program
The varied motivations for pay system change we found suggest that knowledge and
skill-based pay was not simply seen as a way to improve student achievement through
improving the skill level of current staff, as assumed by our theory of action. Though
supporting improved instruction was a common goal, there were other important reasons
for initiating change. It does not appear that most of these early adopters were primarily
focused on using the programs increase teachers' instructional capacity in order to
improve student performance. Decision-makers at most of the sites did not appear to
have based their programs on a theory of action like the one described above. Table 1
summarizes the key factors in each case.
Table 1 
Initiation of Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay Design Process
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Site Primary Motivation 
for Developing
KSBP
Supporting State 
Policy Initiatives
Champion(s) Labor-Management 
Relations
Cincinnati Strategic planning 
process identified 
KSBP as one district
strategy for 
improving student 
achievement.
State proficiency 
tests
Change in State 
licensingstandards
Union Bargaining 
Chair, Associate 
Superintendent,
outside 
consultant from 
university,
Variable; but underlain 
by trust relationship 
between key union and
management staff
Coventry Desire to 
differentiate pay 
according to 
performance and
support new model 
of instruction. 
Secondarily, concern 
about pay inequities
between junior and 
senior teachers; 
desire to keep good
teachers in the 
classroom rather than 
moving to 
administration to
receive more money
None directly, 
though new state 
funding formula 
may have provided
some of the 
additional funds 
needed.
Superintendent, 
union president
Cooperative, after period 
of conflict in the 70's
Douglas 
County
Part of broader 
compensation 
redesign aimed at
reassuring public 
concerned about 
accountability for use 
of public funds
State teacher 
licensing reforms
Assistant 
Superintendent 
for HR; union 
president
Cooperative
Limon Desire to link pay 
with teacher 
performance coupled
with teacher 
dissatisfaction with 
prior individual pay 
for performance
system. Desire to add 
group reward 
component linked to 
state assessment
results.
State financial 
incentives for local 
districts to adopt pay
for performance 
systems; state 
assessment system.
Superintendent 
initially, then 
teachers
Basically cooperative, 
due to new 
superintendent and
relative weakness of 
union in "right to work" 
state.
Manitowoc Desire to provide 
incentives for 
teachers to develop
their skills in order to 
implement more 
constructivist 
instruction; improve
teacher retention; 
support 
union-initiated 
professional
development 
program
State licensing 
reforms
Superintendent 
initially; joined 
by regional union
representative
Cooperative; new leaders 
changed previous more
adversarial relationship
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Robbinsdale Concerns with 
recruiting and 
retaining quality
teachers in 
competition with 
other local districts; 
concern about pay
inequities between 
junior and senior 
teachers.
None directly. Union president Cooperative, based on 
stable district and union
leadership
Vaughn Part of broader 
compensation 
redesign aimed at
improving 
recruitment and 
retention of good 
teachers, desire to 
add teacher
accountability to 
external 
accountability 
provided by charter,
and to address 
perceived pay 
inequities between 
junior and senior
teachers.
Charter status and 
performance 
pressure from 
explicit charter
goals
Principal, 
initially, then 
junior teacher 
and several more
senior staff
No union; relatively high 
level of trust between
teachers and 
administrators based on 
commitment to charter,
participatory governance 
structure, and charisma 
of principal
In Cincinnati and Vaughn, cases where external accountability pressures emphasized the
need to improve student achievement, the primary rationale for the programs was not
expressed in terms of remedying a knowledge or skill deficit among current staff.
Rather, the programs seemed to be intended to motivate staff to change practice and to
reward more accomplished teaching. In Cincinnati, this was supplemented by
dissatisfaction with the current teacher evaluation system and changes in the state
licensing system. At Vaughn, the recruitment and retention of highly-skilled teachers
was an important additional aim. In Robbinsdale, recognizing and rewarding
accomplished teachers, and recruitment of skilled teachers, appear to have been the
major goals. In Coventry, program designers wanted to differentiate teacher pay
according to performance and to keep good teachers in the classroom as well as to
support a particular vision of quality instruction. In Manitowoc, the superintendent's
vision of quality instruction and his desire to provide incentives for teacher learning
were joined by the union leadership's interest in improving pay while staying under
state-imposed expenditure limits and supporting a professional development initiative
developed by the state teachers' association. Both the superintendent and the association
leadership wanted to improve retention, and begin adapting the pay system to state
licensing changes. In Douglas County, knowledge and skill-based pay came about as
part of a pay system redesign primarily intended to respond to public pressure to link
teacher pay and teacher performance, in order to improve accountability for the use of
public funds. Limon, the current program replaced one in which pay increases were
based on individual teacher evaluations. Program designers there found a way to respond
to public interest in linking pay to performance and teachers' concerns about unfairness
of the old system by rewarding both individual professional development and meeting
building and grade-level student achievement goals. Perceived inequities in the
traditional salary schedule between younger, high p
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teachers contributed to motivating pay system change in Coventry, Robbinsdale and
Vaughn. This is interesting given that one advantage often cited for the traditional salary
schedule is that teachers perceive it to be highly equitable (Odden and Kelley, 1997).
State policy, while not a primary driver of pay system change, was an important
background condition in many of the cases. Teacher licensing policy provided a
reinforcement for change in Cincinnati and Manitowoc. State incentives may have
provided motivation for the Limon's initial experimentation with non-traditional pay
systems, and for the district to continue to include teacher and student performance
elements in its current plan. But while all of the sites were in states with some form of
student testing and accountability program, only the two sites with relatively low student
achievement (Cincinnati and Vaughn) felt much pressure from these programs. In the
others, student achievement was either relatively high or not a major issue in the other
communities.
While in all of the cases, a champion or set of champions was important in keeping it
going to a successful conclusion, in three the champion's own agenda was a key impetus
to initiating change. In Coventry and Manitowoc, the programs were initiated partly to
pursue the superintendent's personal vision of good instruction, though in Coventry the
union president actually got discussion going by proposing rewards for National Board
certification. In Robbinsdale, the former union president initiated discussions with the
district based on his desire to ensure that new teachers who fit his conception of a good
teacher would be available when it became necessary to replace retirees. At Vaughn, the
principal began to explore pay innovations to strengthen teachers' sense of accountability
for student performance by adding individual stakes to the overall external
accountability provided in the charter. It is interesting that in four of the seven cases, a
union official was one of the champions, and in a fifth, a Uniserve representative was a
key catalyst of innovation. This suggests that teachers' unions can be supportive of
changing the traditional salary structure. Where union and management relations are
good, and a high- trust relationship exits between union leaders and at least some
management leaders, it appears that teacher compensation innovation can be
successfully initiated.
Process Used To Design The Program
Table 2 summarizes three key aspects of the design process at these sites: the type and
level of teacher participation in design, the relationship to the collective bargaining
process, and the methods used to identify the knowledge and skills to be rewarded.
Table 2 
Characteristics of Knowledge and Skill-based Pay Design Process
Site Relationship to the Collective
Bargaining Process
Type/Level of Teacher
Participation
Method of Knowledge 
& Skill Identification
Cincinnati Commitment to develop plan agreed 
to in contract. Design process took
place outside normal collective 
bargaining though system of
union-management committees. 
Steering committee jointly chaired by
24 teachers from a 
variety of schools 
participated on the
various committees.
Adaptation of standards 
for teacher performance 
found in the Framework
for Teaching (Danielson, 
1996)
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union and management 
representatives. Teachers voted to
approve contract including the 
results, and have opportunity to vote
out system before 9/2002 
implementation.
Coventry Worked out as part of interest-based 
bargaining process
Limited to members of 
bargaining team, though 
rank and file teachers
participated in design of 
the teacher evaluation
system incorporated into 
the plan.
Adaptation of NBPTS 
standards for one pay 
incentive; inductive
process drew from best 
practice literature 
(including work of T.
Sizer and F. Newman) & 
district action research 
for the other
Douglas 
County
Commitment to develop plan agreed 
to in contract. Design process took
place outside normal bargaining via a 
30 member performance pay
committee.
Performance pay 
committee included 20 
teachers from a cross
section of union 
members
Deductive and inductive 
processes used to develop
skill blocks; adaptation of 
NBPTS and Colorado 
licensing standards for
the outstanding teacher 
award.
Limon No formal contract. Program concept 
developed by superintendent and
teacher representatives as part of 
informal negotiations. School Board
passed proposal & teachers' 
association agreed to try proposal.
3 teachers worked with 
Supt. to develop 
concept; detail design
done by a committee 
with 7 teachers and one
administrator.
Left to teacher and 
building administrator, 
based on district-provided
guidelines.
Manitowoc Worked out as part of interest-based 
bargaining process and approved as
part of teacher contract.
8 association bargaining 
team members 
participated as part of
bargaining process
Inductive, based on 
education research; 
adoption of NBPTS
standards.
Robbinsdale Initial concept and outline of skill 
areas and pay levels agreed to in
bargaining. Detail design by set of 
union- management committees.
A few teachers 
participated as members 
of the bargaining team.
More teachers 
participated as members 
of each of 8 committees
responsible for defining 
skill levels and methods 
of assessment.
Adoption of NBPTS 
standards; induction from 
research and experience.
Vaughn No collective bargaining. Design by small group 
of teachers and 
administrators, then
extensive discussions 
via informational 
meetings in committees 
of governance structure.
Primarily deductive from 
educational goals in
charter, with some 
adaptation of the 
Framework for Teaching 
for the rubrics
Teacher participation. Large scale teacher participation in the design process was
present in the three largest organizations (Cincinnati, Douglas County, and
Robbinsdale). In these districts a formal committee process was used to involve a
substantial number of teachers in some aspect of system design. These cases suggest that
broad teacher involvement can have a substantial influence on the content of the plan.
For example, in Cincinnati, teachers on the committees probed for ambiguities in the
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design proposals and contributed specific ideas for design, as well as pushed for
provisions to reassure teachers about fairness. The input of National Board certified
teachers was influential in persuading other teachers on the committee to take the risk of
trying a new system of evaluation and pay. Of the smaller organizations, Limon
provided for relatively extensive participation given the size of the district, while in
Coventry and Manitowoc teacher participation appeared limited to the association
bargaining team. A relatively small group developed the Vaughn plan, though it was
adopted by a vote of the governance committee on which teachers were heavily
represented and after considerable formal and informal discussion among the faculty.
However, involving a substantial number of teachers does not guarantee broad
communication. Outside evaluations of both Douglas County (Hall and Caffellera, 1997)
and Cincinnati (Milanowski and Kellor, 2000b) suggest that many teachers who had not
been active participants in the design process did not seem informed on some aspects of
the systems. In Cincinnati, the large size of the district and the complexity of the
program seemed to require more intensive district or association-sponsored
communications efforts than were initially undertaken.
Relationship to collective bargaining. As expected, none of the programs were
developed though traditional adversarial collective bargaining. It was also expected that
knowledge and skill-based pay programs would be too complex and time- consuming to
work out in detail through the normal negotiation process. However, in three of the
cases, the details of the process were worked out within the negotiation process. It
appears that pay changes of substantial complexity can be developed in the bargaining
process, as long as the parties have achieved a high level of trust and focus on a vision or
desired goal shared by both sides. Where the programs' details were bargained, a clear
sense emerges from the case studies that the shared vision or goal was an important
influence in keeping the discussions from getting sidetracked by issues of who gains and
who loses from particular details of the program.
Knowledge and skill identification. There was no one method of knowledge and skill
identification that dominated in these cases. As expected, many programs made use of
existing standards or definitions of good teaching. In five of the seven cases, an external
set of teacher standards, either the NBPTS or the Framework for Teaching (Danielson,
1996) were influential. Cincinnati is the clearest example of adaptation. Starting with the
Framework for Teaching, the design committee examined each component and revised
wording to fit the district context. Adapting the Framework for teaching allowed the
district to design a system in a relatively short time. In contrast, Robbinsdale, though
beginning with NBPTS standards and making Board certification a major determinant of
knowledge and skill-based pay increases, had not been able to implement its system in
the school year intended in part because of the difficulty in defining the key indicators of
knowledge and skill in the parts of its system not related to the NBPTS standards. In
Coventry, the Framework for Teaching is the basis for the teacher evaluation system, but
the pay incentives are based on separate standards. One provision is based on the
NBPTS certification, and the other on locally-developed criteria with content that differs
from both Framework and the Board's standards. The programs in Douglas County,
Limon, Manitowoc, and Vaughn were not primarily based on existing external
standards, though Vaughn did adapt the format of the Framework for Teaching's rubrics.
The strengths and weaknesses of the deductive approach are illustrated by the Vaughn
case. The knowledge and skills developed were closely tied to school goals, so they had
the potential to focus all teachers on key skills. However, the process of identifying the
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skills and the standards for measuring them was difficult and time consuming. As a
consequence, in the first year the criteria for knowledge and skill demonstration were not
well specified, causing many of the initial participants to have concerns about fairness of
application (Milanowski and Kellor, 1999). These experiences suggest that adapting an
existing model of teacher practice may be the most efficient way to get a knowledge and
skill-based pay system up and running.
Knowledge and Skills Rewarded and Their Organization into a Structure
Table 3 summarizes the knowledge and skills rewarded in the cases, and how (if at all)
the knowledge and skills were organized into some form of developmental sequence or
set of performance levels. As expected all programs rewarded knowledge and skills
relevant to instruction, especially pedagogical skills. There are differences in emphasis,
however. Coventry, Douglas County's skill- blocks, and Manitowoc appeared to be
trying to promote constructivist or "authentic" instruction, while Cincinnati and Vaughn
were concerned with a more generic model of good teaching, though with some
constructivist elements. Limon allowed the teacher and/or building administrator to
determine what sort of instructional skills should be developed within broad district
guidelines. Robbinsdale had not yet worked out its model in detail at the time of our
study. None of the programs appeared to emphasize mastery of content-specific
pedagogy (Shulman,1987, National Commission on Teaching and America's Future,
1996), except as embodied in NBPTS certification, though some of Cincinnati's and
Coventry's locally-developed rubrics referenced it and some of Vaughn's represented
basic aspects of it.
Table 3 
Knowledge and Skills Rewarded—Content and Structure
Site Knowledge and Skill Domains Identified Developmental Levels of Knowledge
and Skills
Cincinnati Three part system: 1) 4 core domains: planning 
and preparing for student learning, creating an
environment for learning, teaching for learning,
and professionalism; specific behavioral
standards in each domain with rubrics describing 
4 levels of performance on each standard 2)
content knowledge; 3) NBPTS standards(a).
Core of system had five developmental 
or career levels; aggregation of rubric
scores on standards define career level.
Coventry Two separate pay provisions. One used NBPTS
standards(a); The other (RHODE program) 
covered authentic pedagogy (instruction and
assessment), self-reflection, differentiating
instruction, family and community involvement, 
and professional development.
Two separate programs with limited 
overlap; they did not represent a
developmental sequence, though 
RHODE could be useful in preparing for
NBPTS certification.
Douglas 
County
Two part system: 1) 9 skill blocks covering
technology, authentic assessment, and diversity; 
2) Outstanding Teacher award with options using:
a) NBPTS standards; b) standards-based
instruction; or c) assessment and instruction, 
content and pedagogy, and collaboration.
Standards for Outstanding Teacher were a 
mixture of knowledge and skill descriptions and
Two separate programs with limited 
overlap; some of the skill blocks
represent developmental sequences.
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descriptions of behavior.
Limon Program did not specify knowledge and skills to 
be sought, leaving this up to teacher &
administrator based on general guidelines that
emphasized the need to focus on instruction and 
student learning.
Unstructured; content and sequence 
open to development by teacher and
administrator
Manitowoc Three aspects of system: 1) district-developed
courses covering authentic instruction, 
technology, writing instruction; 2) NBPTS
standards (a); 3) content knowledge represented
by degrees and credits. Knowledge and skills 
primarily defined in terms of courses and
certifications
Program components are independent ; 
no developmental levels identified at
time of study, though district courses and
Professional Development Certificate 
could prepare teacher for Board
certification.
Robbinsdale NBPTS standards (a), content knowledge, 
classroom teaching, program/curriculum design,
district and school leadership, parental/student
satisfaction. Knowledge and skills defined mostly 
in terms of indicators such as NBPTS certification
and documentable teacher accomplishments.
Program had ten independent elements 
that are evaluated, and the evaluations
aggregated to produce a pay level. The
different elements represented multiple 
ways to define good teaching rather than
a developmental sequence.
Vaughn Core system based on 11 locally-defined domains 
of skill in lesson planning and classroom
management, literacy, language development,
technology, special education inclusion, 
mathematics, history and social science, and
science pedagogy, instruction in primary language
for English learners, arts. Additional knowledge 
and skills rewarded defined by NBPTS standards
(a)
, Masters' degree, state licensure level.
Core of system defined 3 levels for 
additional pay: level 1 based on
achieving an average rubric score of 2.5 
in 6 of the "essential" domains; level 2
required an average of 3 in those 
domains, then provides additional pay
for rubric score of 3 in any of 5
additional domains; level 3 based on 
achieving an average rubric score of 3.5
in all domains.
Note: (a) The content of the National Board standards varies by subject and level among
the 30+ certifications offered; however, almost all standards include the domains of
knowledge of students, knowledge of subject, knowledge of pedagogy, creating a
learning environment, use of a variety of assessment methods, reflection on practice, and
collaboration with parents and colleagues.
Most of the programs are eclectic in the way they specify what knowledge and skills
rewarded. While most of the rewards in the Cincinnati and Vaughn programs are based
on developing knowledge and skills that are described in terms of teaching behaviors or
skilled performance, there is some reward provided for degrees or certifications
analogous to the credits in the traditional schedule. Another set of programs, Douglas
County, Coventry, and Robbinsdale, mixed external certifications with more or less
detailed descriptions of desired performance or behavior. Limon provided relatively
little guidance, leaving the teacher and administrator wide leeway as to the knowledge
and skills to be developed. The Manitowoc program specified its knowledge and skills
in terms of courses and certifications, analogous to degrees and credits, rather than
describing behaviors or skills. 
In only a few of the programs, most notably those of Cincinnati and Vaughn, did the
knowledge and skills specified approach the ideal of an integrated developmental
sequence or structure of levels. The other programs had not organized the knowledge
and skills into a core set of standards, nor provided a continuum of skill development
that unified the knowledge and skill domains along a developmental path or career
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progression. Even the Cincinnati and Vaughn programs did not appear to integrate their
local standards with the National Board standards, treating Board certification as an
additional credential like a Masters' degree rather than as another developmental level.
Though the programs in Coventry and Manitowoc were informed by a coherent vision of
instruction on the part of their original champions, these programs did not include a
developmental progression linked with pay increases at the time we studied them.
How Knowledge and Skill Acquisition Was Assessed
Table 4 summarizes the assessment methods used in each of the seven programs,
including the use of external assessments. All use some form of performance
assessment, though the extent to which these assessments are central to the program
varies. The Cincinnati and Vaughn assessment systems were primarily based on
demonstrating knowledge and skills via classroom performance and are part of the
regular teacher evaluation. Programs that use National Board certification as a criteria
for pay increases (Manitowoc, Robbinsdale, and Coventry) incorporated the
performance emphasis of the Board's assessments. Coventry also used a
performance-based approach in its local assessments. The assessments at the end of
Douglas County's skill blocks are performance-based, though performance in training is
not always the same as classroom performance. The guidelines for the Limon process
emphasized connecting the professional development documented in the portfolio to
classroom practice and student learning, though it is up to the teacher and administrator
to implement these guidelines. One of Robbinsdale's performance dimensions involved
principal evaluation via classroom observation, and several others are based on
real-world accomplishments rather than degrees or credits. The observations were to be
part of the regular teacher evaluation process, and the results one element in a teacher
portfolio that documents knowledge and skill. Manitowoc's program mostly relied on
indirect evidence like certifications and course attendance, more analogous to the
traditional degrees and credits. Performance assessment was incorporated mostly though
the incentive provided for National Board certification.
Table 4 
Methods of Assessment 
Site Locally-Developed Assessments Used External Assessments Used
Cincinnati Internal assessment of performance in the four
primary knowledge and skill domains by site 
administrators and peer evaluators with subject
expertise. Types of evidence: 6 classroom
observations; portfolio including artifacts such as 
lesson plans, student work, parent contact logs,
professional development logs.
NBPTS assessment, degree completion, 
and licensure will be used to determine
eligibility for additional pay elements.
Coventry Internal assessment based on a portfolio prepared 
by teacher used for the RHODE program.
Portfolio including evidence that/of: teachers
know students, have prepared for and practiced
differentiated learning, ability to motivate and 
support all students, family and community
contact, and professional development. Also self-
analysis of teaching and assessment of student 
work. 
NBPTS assessment used for pay 
increment for NBPTS certification.
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RHODE: 9 element portfolio evaluated using 
rubrics. Each element scored for evidence of
presence of 5 behaviors or outcomes each worth 1 
point. Total score of 43 points qualifies for award.
Douglas 
County
Performance-based assessment at end of each 
skill block done by course instructors. No specific
rubrics or standards defined outstanding teacher;
review of portfolio prepared for outstanding
teacher award done by administrators.
NA
Limon Portfolio documenting activities toward fulfilling
professional growth goal evaluated by 
administrators. No specific rubrics or standards to
evaluate skill acquisition
NA
Manitowoc Mixture of external (NBPTS, Professional 
Development Certificate, degrees) and internal
(local teacher-taught courses) opportunities.
Standards or rubrics used to evaluate skill 
acquisition depended on course or certification.
Grades/degrees/certifications from 
higher education. NBPTS assessment
used for pay element rewarding NBPTS
certification.
Robbinsdale Documentation of achievements via portfolio,
classroom observations; student/parent surveys.
Evidence evaluated by committee consisting of 3
appointees of superintendent, 3 appointees of
union president. Specific rubrics/guidelines 
remained to be developed for most domains.
NBPTS assessment used for pay element 
rewarding NBPTS certification.
Vaughn Classroom observations, artifacts such as lesson
plans and student work evaluated by an 
administrator, grade-level peer, and self.
Four-level rubrics used specific behavioral 
examples to define levels of performance in each
domain.
Grades/degrees/certifications from 
higher education used for pay elements
rewarding credentialing. NBPTS 
assessment used for pay increment for
NBPTS certification.
Use of external assessments. Five of the seven programs included the NBPTS
assessments. However, these assessments were not typically integrated with the local
assessment system, nor used as measure of core teaching skills. In most cases, the
NBPTS assessment was included because of pay incentives for NBPTS certification,
which in turn was treated as an additional degree, rather than as an integral part of the
knowledge and skill model. The exceptions are Coventry and Robbinsdale. In Coventry,
while the domains measured by the local and Board assessments differ, the processes are
similar, with the local process designed to help teachers prepare for the Board
assessment. In Robbinsdale, the NBPTS assessment was the criterion for a sizable part
of the knowledge and skill pay incentive, and seemed to form the conceptual anchor for
the program, but there were several other locally-assessed ways for teachers to
demonstrate knowledge and skill in order to increase their pay.
Validity and reliability. According to the theory of action, knowledge and skill-based
pay programs require methods of assessment that are valid and reliable, and recognized
as such by teachers. At the time of our studies, little information was available about the
validity or reliability of the assessments in any of the programs. From the information
available, it appears that the most common external assessments, those of the NBPTS,
have at least as much reliability and validity as many accepted human resource selection
and evaluation techniques (Milanowski, Odden, and Youngs, 1998; Jaeger, 1998). Only
Cincinnati and Vaughn appeared to have confronted these issues with respect to their
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locally-developed assessments. Both have looked at the inter-rater agreement of their
internal assessment systems and have been relatively satisfied that an acceptable level of
agreement exists. At this point, no district has looked at the relationship between its
assessments and independent measures of teacher performance, such as student
achievement, though at least two were planning to explore this connection.
Information on teacher perceptions of the fairness of these assessments was available for
three cases. In Cincinnati, teachers participating in the field test of the assessment
system generally believed that the results of the process were fair, but many had
concerns about the fairness of the process, especially with respect to administrator
qualifications and the consistency of rating across administrators (Milanowski and
Kellor, 2000b). At Vaughn, in the initial year, many of the teachers covered by the
system had concerns about the consistency of the evaluations and the difficulties
evaluators had in making the requisite number of classroom observations (Milanowski
and Kellor, 1999). After the rubrics were more fully developed and problems with
scheduling of observations addressed in the second year, fairness perceptions improved
substantially (Milanowski and Kellor, 2000a). In Douglas County, while fairness
perceptions were not explicitly assessed, Hall and Caffarella (1997) did interview and
survey teachers about their reactions to the program. Teachers did not identify fairness
concerns as a major issue, though several teachers did mention problems such as
subjectivity in the evaluation of the teacher portfolios. It may be that the lack of
expressed fairness concerns was due to the lower stakes of the assessments for
individual teachers (due to the relatively small dollar amounts associated with the skill
blocks and Outstanding Teacher award) the fact that individual teachers could choose to
participate or not.
Size and Structure of Knowledge and Skill Incentives
Table 5 describes the programs' knowledge and skill-based pay structures. The programs
can be roughly categorized as falling into three groups: those that have essentially
replaced the traditional schedule (Cincinnati, Limon), those that have modified the
schedule, typically by reducing the importance of degrees and credits in exchange for
more performance-oriented representations of knowledge and skill (Vaughn,
Robbinsdale), and those that have supplemented the traditional design by adding
knowledge and skill-based elements (Coventry, Douglas County, Manitowoc). We
expected that organizations feeling more pressure to improve student achievement
would be more likely to modify or replace the traditional schedule, but the association is
not that strong. Cincinnati and Vaughn fit the pattern of organizations under pressure
implementing major pay change, and Coventry, Douglas County and Manitowoc fit the
pattern of less pressure and more incremental change. Limon was an exception, in that it
replaced the traditional schedule completely, but for reasons other than providing a
stronger incentive for knowledge and skill acquisition. Robbinsdale was another
exception, with a relatively major pay system change but little pressure to improve
student achievement. It should be noted that the potential impact of the more radical
changes represented by the Robbinsdale and Vaughn pay systems were offset by
limitations on who is covered by the new system. To allay apprehension on the part of
senior teachers socialized to the traditional system, these two programs required that
only new or less senior teachers participate, leaving others on the traditional schedule.
Table 5
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Knowledge and Skill Pay Provisions and Relative Size of Incentive
Site Pay Provisions KSBP 
Incentive as 
% of 
Beginning
Base and 
Maximum 
Salary
Provisions to Win
TeacherAcceptance
Cincinnati Core program: 5 career levels of teaching 
practice with salary ranges of $30,000,
32,000-35,750, 38,750-49,250, 52,500- 55,000,
and 60,000-62,500; movement between levels 
based on knowledge & skill assessment,
movement within levels through a limited 
number of steps based on seniority; additional
base pay add-ons of $4,600 for Masters degree,
9,375 for Ph.D.; $1,250 for dual certification, 
$1,000 for NBPTS certification, up to $4,000
(time-limited) for skill blocks.
Base: 60.8% 
Maximum: 
23.4%
High seniority teachers 
(22 years and up) can 
remain on old salary
schedule or can volunteer 
to participate in new
system.
Coventry $6,500 add-on for life of NBPTS certification; 
$1,000 per year for four years based on
achieving a cut-off score on a locally-assessed
portfolio (RHODE program).
Base: 22.8% 
(19.8% for 
NBPTS, 3% 
for RHODE) 
Maximum: 
9.7% 
(8.4% for 
NBPTS, 
1.3% for 
RHODE
Improved district 
contribution to teacher 
retirement plan; early
retirement option.
Douglas 
County
$300- 500 bonuses per skill block for 9 blocks; 
$1000 annual bonus for being designated an
outstanding teacher.
Base: 17.4% 
Maximum: 
6.9%
3% across the board pay 
increase; knowledge and 
skill part of plan
voluntary
Limon Entry pay based on a traditional seniority and
credits schedule, but after entry progression 
based on an across the board increase, $1,000
for a Master's and $3,000 for a Ph.D., plus up to
$1,200 in performance based increases, $400 of 
which is based on meeting individual
professional development goals.
Base: 1.5% 
Maximum: 
1.0%
Cost of living adjustment 
added to pay system,
rectification of base pay 
inequities between new 
hires and more senior
teachers.
Manitowoc Expanded traditional salary schedule to provide 
more lanes and allow movement between lanes
based on locally-developed courses and
classroom-relevant university certification 
aligned to NBPTS, as well as traditional credits
and degrees; 13% salary add-ons for NBPTS
certification and Ph.D. degree. Seniority 
movement within a lane capped at lower pay
levels to encourage obtaining advanced degrees
and other recognized professional development.
Base: 13% 
NBPTS 
NA other 
parts 
Maximum: 
13% NBPTS 
NA other 
parts
Improved funding of 
retiree health insurance
premiums; new pay
elements not covered by 
cost controls
Robbinsdale Traditional salary schedule modified by 
reducing number of lanes from 11 to 4 and steps
from 13 to 7. Knowledge and skill-based
component provided for additional pay of up to 
$15,000, with the actual amount based on
points earned in 10 categories: NBPTS
Base: 56.1% 
Maximum: 
23.8%
To be applied to 
newly-hired teachers or
volunteers
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certification, principal evaluation, individual 
accomplishments, district projects, contribution
to teams, content knowledge, professional
leadership, and customer satisfaction.
Vaughn One 11-step seniority-based lane, $1,000 
add-on for California teaching credential,
$2,000 add-on for Masters degree, $2,000
add-on for qualifying as demonstrator for 
student teachers, $4,000 add-on for NBPTS
certification. Three levels of competency-based
pay add-ons (up to $13,100) earned by 
achieving a minimum score or better on rubrics
in ten areas: Lesson planning and classroom
management, literacy, language development, 
technology, special education inclusion,
mathematics, history and social science, and
science pedagogy, instruction in primary 
language for English learners, arts.
Base: 48.7% 
Maximum: 
22.7%
Applied only to 
newly-hired teachers or 
volunteers from among
veteran teachers
In all of the cases, some sort of quid quo pro or provision was added to sell the program,
especially to highly senior teachers. It is interesting that in two of the cases, the
consideration was relatively small. In Manitowoc, it was an additional district
contribution toward retiree health insurance premiums. In Cincinnati, it was the
exemption of a relatively small number of very senior teachers who would be likely to
retire soon after the pay provisions took effect. In four cases (Robbinsdale, Vaughn,
Douglas County, and Coventry) participation in the knowledge and skill-based pay part
of the system was voluntary for all or senior teachers (though at Vaughn most of the
senior teachers opted into the system in the second year). In Coventry, the district also
increased its contribution to the teacher retirement plan and provided an early retirement
option. In Limon, a small cost of living adjustment was added to pay system, and the
school board corrected some base pay inequities that had emerged between new hires
and more senior teachers. These experiences suggest that the potential opposition of
senior teachers was an important issue to program designers. However, limiting the
program to new teachers or volunteers may dilute the impact of the program on
motivating improvements in instructional capacity. At Vaughn, the hope of the
program's designers was that experienced teachers would volunteer to participate, and
many did in the second year. In Robbinsdale, this was not a major concern because the
primary impetus for designing the system was not to improve the skills of current
teachers. 
Both base pay increases and bonuses were used to reward knowledge and skill
acquisition. Cincinnati, Coventry, Limon, Manitowoc, and Robbinsdale relied primarily
on base pay increases, while the Vaughn and Douglas County knowledge and skill-based
pay programs used bonuses. In some of the cases, however, some or all of the base pay
increases were time limited "add-ons": the pay increase continued only for a fixed
period, after which knowledge and skills had to be re-demonstrated. The programs that
rewarded NBPTS certification provided the extra pay for the 10 year life of the
certification. Increases based on locally- assessed knowledge and skills were provided
for four to five years in three cases. At Vaughn, the base/bonus distinction was blurred
because the bonuses are pro-rated and the extra pay is included as an add-on to the
monthly base. This provided continuity of income for teachers, though the extra money
needs to be re-earned every year.
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Though the pay systems in these cases were diverse, one notable similarity across them
was that six of seven retained a seniority-based element. (Limon eliminated seniority as
a basis for progression after entry.) In this regard, most of these programs differed from
private sector implementations of the knowledge and skill pay concept, which typically
eliminate seniority as a basis for pay (Jenkins et al, 1992). However, in five of the cases
where seniority increases remained, the new pay system decreased the emphasis on
seniority by reducing the number of seniority steps or capping seniority-based pay
progression at a lower level. Another similarity was that all of the systems continue to
reward Master's degrees, suggesting that the K-12 sector continues to value higher
educational attainment, and that moving away from this traditional valuation may be too
radical a change to be accepted by teachers. It should be noted, however, that Cincinnati
planned to limit pay increases for Master's degrees to those relevant to the teaching
assignment.
The motivation model suggests that, all else equal, more substantial incentives will be
more effective in motivating knowledge and skill acquisition. One way to assess the size
of the incentive is to compare it to the entry-level salary rate and to the maximum salary
pay a teacher can earn in a school or district. Table 5 contains estimates of the
magnitude of the knowledge and skill incentive in the form of the percentage available
for knowledge and skill-based elements (beyond those recognized in the traditional
salary structure) as a percentage of the beginning base pay and as a percentage the
highest pay rate available (including the knowledge and skill-based incentive, but
exclusive of pay for additional activities like coaching). Again, significant variation
existed, but it is clear that in three cases, Cincinnati, Robbinsdale, and Vaughn, the
knowledge and skill incentive was substantial. The incentives provided by these three, as
a percent of beginning pay, were on the order of those reported for private sector plans,
which provide for 50 to 100% increases based on knowledge and skills (Gupta et al,
1986, Jenkins et al, 1992; Tucker and Cofsky, 1994.) The expectation that a larger
incentive would be found where the motivation for implementation was to improve
student achievement was partially fulfilled, in that some of the largest incentives were
provided by Cincinnati and Vaughn. However, recruiting good teachers was the primary
motivation in Robbinsdale, the other organization with a large incentive.
How the Acquisition of the Knowledge and Skills are Supported
Table 6 summarizes the professional development associated with the knowledge and
skill-based pay programs, and the links between knowledge and skill-based pay and
other aspects of the human resource management system.
Table 6 
Integration with Professional Development and Other Human
Resource Management Programs
Site District Support for Acquiring the
Knowledge & Skills Needed
Relationship to Other HR Programs
Cincinnati While the district had an extensive 
professional development program covering
many of the skills relevant to the teaching
The knowledge and skill assessment system 
is same as used for teacher performance
evaluation. At the time of our study there
24 of 40
standards, there was no explicit linkage 
between the program and the standards that
would allow teachers to determine which 
courses applied to each standard. District had
new teacher mentoring and peer review
programs that were being converted to use the 
teacher standards.
were no links to teacher recruitment and 
selection.
Coventry Major changes to the professional 
development program were made to support
improved instruction, but this was done before 
the knowledge and skill-based pay program
was developed. Several courses have been
developed to address procedural aspects of the 
knowledge and skill-based pay system, but
otherwise there does not appear to be much
explicit linkage between professional 
development and the pay program.
A modified version of the Framework for 
Teaching was used for teacher evaluation.
This was also provided to job candidates as
part of the recruitment process, and some 
interview questions are based on
Framework elements. Though the district 
regarded the Framework as consistent with
the NBPTS standards and the RHODE 
program, there was no formal link to the
knowledge and skill-based pay programs.
Douglas 
County
Courses for skill blocks are provided by the
district. Although the district offers a 
substantial number of other professional
development classes, none are directly linked 
to the outstanding teacher program.
Completing the portfolio itself was considered
a form of professional development.
Originally, a connection with the state's 
multiple level licensing system was
planned, but delays and changes in the state
program prevented this development. 
Teacher evaluation was connected to
regular pay progression, but the only 
explicit link to the knowledge and
skill-based pay program was that teachers 
rated unsatisfactory cannot apply for the
outstanding teacher award.
Limon The overall professional development program 
was expanded at the same time the new pay
program was developed. The nature of the
individual professional growth goals left the 
choice of development activities to the teacher
and supervisor, subject to general district
guidelines.
Initial program tied pay to teacher 
evaluation system; current program no
longer has the direct tie. The overall pay for
performance system was explained to job 
candidates during recruitment;
administrators felt this led to self-screening 
and higher retention.
Manitowoc The knowledge and skill-based pay program 
was directly linked to a specified university
professional development program and to
locally-developed and provided courses. 
Existing local courses covered instruction,
technology, and student writing.
No specific links between this program and 
other HR programs had yet been developed.
Robbinsdale Due to delays in implementing the program, 
no specific skill-based pay program had been
developed at the time of our study.
Due to delays in developing the system, 
connections with other HR systems were not
been developed at the time of our study.
Regular teacher evaluations were one 
element in teacher portfolio documenting
knowledge and skill. Initially, the 
knowledge and skill- based pay program
was used as a recruitment tool, but this 
ceased with the delay in implementation.
Vaughn Some formal professional development 
provided around literacy and classroom
management, provision of mentors for new
teachers or those having difficulties meeting 
basic standards, and using coaching tied to the
assessment process as part of skill building.
The knowledge and skill-based pay 
assessment standards were also used for
teacher evaluation. The pay system was
explained to job candidates as part of job 
interview. Administrators felt this was a
recruiting advantage since most newer 
teachers could earn more at Vaughn than in
the surrounding district.
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At the time of our study, it did not appear that many of the programs had a strong
professional development component specifically designed to provide teachers with the
knowledge and skills rewarded. Those programs with larger incentives and more radical
structures had not yet developed a corresponding comprehensive professional
development programs. Vaughn had only begun to develop a comprehensive
professional development program linked to the specific skills in the model. Formal
professional development was provided on some domains, including literacy and
classroom management, and mentoring and teaming were beginning to be used to help
develop skills in the program domains. Cincinnati, though it had a comprehensive
knowledge and skill model, had not yet modified their fairly extensive professional
development program to link up with it. Robbinsdale's model was not yet fully fleshed
out, but the diversity of the elements rewarded (ranging from principal evaluation to
professional leadership and parent satisfaction) may make it difficult to identify specific
skills and develop a coherent professional development program linked to the pay
system. Those programs with tight links had smaller incentives and made less radical
changes in the pay schedule. Manitowoc and Douglas County had the tightest links, in
that parts of their pay program were directly tied to taking specific courses. However,
both had not yet developed more than a relatively few courses covering a limited range
of skills, and other professional development opportunities were not yet aligned with a
comprehensive knowledge and skill model. The strategy of these two districts appeared
to be to start small, paying first for attaining a few important skills. Coventry did not
appear to link the professional development program to the pay program, perhaps due to
the limited scope of the latter. The Limon program, and Douglas County's outstanding
teacher award, gave teachers considerable choice as to what skills would be rewarded
and therefore did not provide the basis for a comprehensive, linked professional
development program.
At the point at which we studied these programs, the pay systems were not closely
integrated with other human resource management activities. Two of the programs with
the largest incentives, Cincinnati and Vaughn combined knowledge and skill assessment
with teacher evaluation. Robbinsdale integrated the evaluation system by using it as one
of eight elements in its assessment system. Vaughn used the knowledge and skill pay
system in recruiting teachers, and Robbinsdale had planned to, but since the system was
insufficiently developed, had not done so at the time of our study. None of the
organizations appear to have used the knowledge and skill model in selecting teacher
candidates at the time we studied them.
Additional Costs of the Programs and Methods of Funding
Table 7 shows the estimated additional costs, where available, of the knowledge and
skill-based pay programs, and the method of funding these costs. It should be noted that
the extra cost of salaries was hard to estimate, since there was little experience at most
sites to tell how many teachers will move to the higher pay levels, and at what rate they
will move. Therefore few solid costs estimates are shown. From the limited data
provided, it appears that transition costs can be quite low, as can the costs in the first
years before many teachers have had a chance to develop the full range of knowledge
and skills. However, it is also clear that some of the programs provided the potential of
substantially higher salaries. Comparing the maximum pay attainable under the former
system with that attainable under the knowledge and skill-based pay system, a teacher in
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Cincinnati at the top of the schedule has the potential to achieve a 21% higher pay rate.
In Manitowoc, such a teacher has the potential to earn 38% more, and Vaughn, 22%
more. The other programs provided a substantially smaller additional pay opportunity.
Limon provided only about 1.5% more pay, Coventry, about 11%, and Douglas County,
about 7.4%. Robbinsdale's proposed plan provided for the same maximum as in the old
schedule.
Table 7 
Costs and Funding
Site Costs of Pay and Administration Source of Funds for Pay and
Administration
Cincinnati Transition cost to new pay schedule estimated 
at 0.2- 0.4% of payroll; ultimate extra cost of
pay changes not estimated. Cost of
administration not known, but compensation 
for 8 full-time teachers to do classroom
observations could be about $500,000
annually.
Re-allocation of some of the dollars spent 
on degrees and credits in the current pay
schedule, reallocation of staff time and
budget resources to administer the system. 
Some new money raised via higher local
taxes.
Coventry Estimate not available because program had 
just begun.
Most funding appeared to have come from 
increases in state funding. Reallocation of
existing time and funds used to cover
administration, most notably conversion of 
an administrator position to Director of
Professional Development.
Douglas 
County
District estimate of cost of additional 
knowledge and skill pay elements was about
0.5% of payroll. No estimate of administrative
costs is available.
Additional funds raised from local tax base.
Limon District has not made an estimate, but if all
teachers received the professional growth 
bonus, the cost would be about 1.4% of
payroll.
Reallocation of existing funds and 
additional funds raised from local tax base.
Manitowoc No estimate of additional salary costs solely 
due to knowledge and skill elements was
available. Total package increase estimated at
1.5% to 2% of operating budget, and 3.8% of 
payroll. No additional administrative costs
expected by district.
Local Academy was expected to be 
self-financing. New money available from
tax base within legal limits used to finance 
pay costs.
Robbinsdale No estimate available from district. Since the
program would be applied initially to new 
teachers, immediate additional costs would
likely be quite low.
Plan was to reallocate existing funds to 
cover additional pay costs.
Vaughn Total performance plan cost about 3.5% of 
payroll in 1999-2000, expected to rise to 6% in
2000-2001. No estimate of administrative
costs available, but some of the time of three 
new administrative positions should be
considered part of the administrative cost.
Reallocation of savings from efficiencies in
management and in managing funds 
provided by formula from the state and
district; also, new money provided in the 
state funding formula was allocated to pay.
In none of these cases had estimates of additional administrative costs been made. The
assumption appeared to be that the time and staff needed to administer the programs
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could be added to exiting workload or handled by reallocations of current staff. For
several of the programs, this assumption will probably not prove problematic, because of
limited scope or reliance on external assessments. For example, because it relied on
discrete course grades and external certifications, the Manitowoc system requires little in
the way of new administrative machinery, beyond record-keeping. The Limon, Douglas
County, and Coventry systems required additional administrator time to review
portfolios, but Douglas County, as described by Hall and Caffarella (1997), had not
found this a major strain, perhaps because a relatively limited proportion of teachers
participated in that part of the program. On the other hand, Cincinnati's experience, in a
field test of the assessment system, suggested that most administrators did not have the
time to do extensive evaluation (Milanowski and Kellor, 2000). In response, the district
decided to hire eight teachers to specialize as evaluators. Vaughn, too, had initial
difficulties finding the time for peers and administrators to do the required number of
classroom observations. The school responded by reallocating positions to provide for
more administrators, by increasing use of substitutes to free up the time of peer
assessors, and by hiring two retired teachers as part-time assessors. As a charter school,
Vaughn had a considerable amount of budgetary flexibility, and was able to tap grant
funds to pay for part of these additional administrative costs. These experiences suggest
that it is likely that knowledge and skill-based pay designs that use extensive internal
assessment will require the allocation of additional resources to program administration.
Discussion
This article has attempted to summarize some of the main features of seven innovative
teacher compensation programs that rewarded teachers for developing their knowledge
and skills. Based on a simple theory of action, a model of motivation, and descriptions
of private sector experience, a set of dimensions was developed to guide the analysis and
comparison of the design of the programs. The major findings from the comparison are
summarized below.
Motivation for change. There are a variety of reasons for designing knowledge and
skill-based pay programs. Contrary to the assumptions underlying our theory of action,
most programs were not primarily motivated by a desire to improve the knowledge and
skills of the existing teacher workforce in order to improve student achievement, though
some programs were motivated by a desire to recruit and retain more highly-skilled
teachers and to support a particular vision of instruction. Other reasons illustrated in
these cases were to respond to public pressure for a linkage of teacher pay to
performance and to differentiate teacher pay based on teacher quality. State-level student
assessment and accountability programs were an important factor in only those cases
where student achievement was low. In most of the cases, however, student achievement
was not considered a problem. Districts with high or acceptable student achievement
appear just as likely to innovate, though the most comprehensive of the programs we
studied were found where there was pressure to improve student achievement. Programs
in Cincinnati and Coventry and at Vaughn seemed designed to motivate teachers to
practice in certain ways, rather than to motivating them to develop specific skills. These
programs more closely resemble private sector competency-based pay programs, which
often include a more general performance component, while the skill blocks in Douglas
County and the Manitowoc program resemble the skill-based pay model, in which the
development of specified skills is rewarded.
28 of 40
Design process. In all cases, teachers participated in the design of the programs. The
larger districts used formal committee structures outside of the collective bargaining
process to involve relatively large numbers of teachers in developing the details. The
smaller organizations were more likely to have designed their systems with less
involvement. Contrary to expectations, some programs were designed within the
negotiation process, though these tended to be the simpler ones. In all of our cases, a
relatively high level of association-management cooperation, or trust between
administrators and teachers, was present. Teacher compensation change is possible in a
collective bargaining environment, and association or union leaders have been
champions of the process.
Knowledge and skills rewarded. The knowledge and skills rewarded are generally those
related to instruction, though none of the programs studied placed heavy emphasis on
content-specific pedagogy. At the time we studied them, relatively few of the programs
had defined an integrated model of the knowledge and skills needed for quality
instruction, nor a progression of levels of skill development providing a path to mastery,
though some of the organizations may have been moving incrementally toward such a
model. There was no dominant method of knowledge and skill identification in these
cases. Though most of the programs included the National Board standards as part of
their model, the Board's standards were typically not highly integrated with the other
knowledge and skills rewarded.
Knowledge and skill assessment. All of the programs use some form of performance
assessment to assess the acquisition of at least some of the knowledge and skills
rewarded, rather than relying completely on degrees or credits as indicators of teacher
knowledge and skill. Five of the seven programs included external assessments,
typically the NBPTS assessments. However, these assessments were not typically
integrated into the assessment system as a check on internal assessments, or used as an
indicator of a higher level of core teaching skills.
Size and structure of knowledge and skill incentives. As expected, there was some
tendency for programs that were motivated by the need to improve student achievement
to move farthest from the traditional schedule. These programs were likely to send the
strongest motivational signals to teachers. However, in none of these cases were
seniority and graduate degrees eliminated as a basis for pay progression. In four of the
seven cases, movement away from the traditional salary concepts was incremental.
Support for knowledge and skill development. Few of the programs we studied have
developed a coordinated professional development program that is specifically linked to
the knowledge and skill model. Lack of alignment of professional development
programs with the knowledge and skill model may reduce the motivational force of the
rewards if teachers do not perceive they have the opportunities to acquire the knowledge
and skills. That direct links to professional development programs are not strong may be
due to the fact that the programs were not intended to remedy knowledge and skill
deficits on the part of current staff. None of the programs have fully aligned their human
resource management programs with a developmentally-sequenced knowledge and skill
model. This suggests that the promise of alignment in fostering a shared conception of
good teaching has not yet been fulfilled.
Costs and funding. The cost of transition to a knowledge and skill-based pay system
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appeared to be low in the short run, though costs are likely to increase over time to the
point that new money will be needed to fund them. Little information on administrative
costs was available, and in most of the cases, the increased administrative costs were
met using existing resources. For the more ambitious programs, administrative costs are
likely to be significant, and may not have been fully realized at the time of our study.
Implications for Research on Knowledge an Skill-Based Pay in the K-
12 Sector
Unlike the private sector, where skill-based pay and competency- based pay systems
appear to have become relatively codified, there are multiple models of knowledge and
skill-based pay in the K-12 sector. These various models were designed to serve a
variety of purposes, not simply to support improved instruction. This implies that in
evaluating the success of knowledge and skill-based pay programs, it will be important
to take into account other program goals and to develop measures of program impact in
addition to measures of instructional capacity or student achievement. For example, to
the extent that recruitment and retention of highly-skilled teachers is an important goal,
the quality of new hires and the degree to which more skilled teachers are retained and
less skilled teachers leave will be an important outcome to measure. To the extent that
programs are a response to community pressure for pay for performance or
accountability, it may be necessary to look at community perceptions of the program.
One rough indicator that Douglas County and Cincinnati informants mentioned was
increased willingness on the part of the community to pass referenda providing more tax
money for education. To the extent that the goal is to support the diffusion of a particular
vision of teaching, measuring teacher acceptance and implementation of this vision will
be important.
Of course, the most important outcome to many organizations considering developing
and funding knowledge and skill-based pay programs is likely to be whether they are
effective in motivating skill acquisition, changing instruction, and improving student
achievement. But because knowledge and skill-based pay at this point encompasses such
a variety of designs, it will be important to develop some measures of the potential
causal "strength" of the program. A set of benchmarks could be developed, as was done
by evaluators of the New American Schools implementation in Memphis (Smith et al,
1998, Ross, 2000). This would entail using the theory of action and motivational model
to specify dimensions and develop some rubrics for judging how close the design and
implementation comes to the ideal specified in the theory, then relating these ratings to
measures of effects. For example, the theory of action and motivational model suggest
that a program providing few professional development opportunities, little
administrator and peer support for new skill acquisition, and relatively small incentives,
would have a limited effect on instruction and student achievement. In such a case lack
of evidence that knowledge and skill-based pay was associated with improved
instruction or student achievement would not be surprising, but also would not provide
much information about whether a stronger knowledge and skill-based pay design can
help improve instruction.
It is interesting to speculate as to whether knowledge and skill- based pay in the K-12
sector will evolve toward a plurality of systems reflecting strategic district or school
goals, local history, and designers' preferences, or toward a family of similar systems
based on external, generic standards. In the private sector, the theoretical argument for
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knowledge and skill-based pay is that it can provide incentives to develop
organization-specific skills that support a unique competitive strategy. The K-12 analog
would be a set of schools operating under school choice or voucher systems, with little
procedural regulation. Of our cases, the Vaughn charter school best fits this model and it
did "tailor" its knowledge and skill model more closely to its mission, as set forth in its
charter. But as argued above, in the K-12 sector the core skills are likely to be similar
across schools and districts, and there is little competition across schools or districts.
Thus over time we may see a tendency for convergence on external standards and
assessments. The limiting factor appears to be a lack of external assessments aimed at
differentiating among mid-career teachers.
Implications for Policy Makers and Program Designers
The experiences of the seven organizations we studied suggest a number of fairly clear
lessons for the design of knowledge and skill- based pay programs. First, that even the
most radical of the seven programs we studied retained seniority and degrees as pay
criteria suggests that it may be unrealistic to expect completely performance- based pay
systems to emerge. It may be necessary to retain some aspects of the traditional structure
in order to have a realistic chance of implementing a pay system that rewards the
acquisition of instruction-relevant knowledge and skills. As the Cincinnati and Vaughn
cases illustrate, a program can be designed to provide significant incentives for
knowledge and skill development while retaining some rewards for seniority.
Second, teachers' associations may be more open to changes in pay systems than
administrators or school board members expect, but this openness is likely to be the
product of high levels of trust developed through cooperation on other issues, and design
features aimed at encouraging acceptance by senior teachers may be needed.
Third, it may be easier and faster to adapt a set of pre-existing teacher standards rather
than to develop a knowledge and skill model from scratch.
Fourth, the transition costs to even a fairly extensive knowledge and skill-based pay
structure can be low. It is, however, likely that administrative costs will be higher where
an extensive system of internal skill assessment is used, and that payroll costs may
significantly increase in the long term. So it is advisable to plan for ways to cover these
costs. 
It is also interesting to note that, for these pioneer organizations, state programs such as
assessment and accountability systems or teacher licensing supported rather than drove
teacher compensation change. Local issues, union-management relations, and the
agendas of leaders were probably more important as initiators of change, and will likely
be very important in sustaining and guiding a program until it has taken hold. For
state-level policy makers who desire to use salary dollars more strategically to improve
student achievement, one implication is that it maybe useful to provide a comprehensive
and coherent model of knowledge and skills that are directly related to improving
instruction for local organizations to adapt and customize. This would help focus teacher
compensation change on strategically-important goals. The model could also be linked
to state standards for students. If one way to improve student achievement toward state
content standards is to ensure that teachers can develop and teach high quality
standards-based curriculum units to all students (Cohen and Hill, 2000), then the model
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should emphasize the knowledge and skills needed to do this. Integration of the model
with a multi- level licensing system and providing funds to increase pay for teachers
with higher-level licenses could be another way for state-level policy makers to focus the
system on strategically important goals.
Not only might state-level action help to encourage greater coherence and focus on
improved instruction, but there may also be significant efficiencies to be gained from
developing a state-level model rather than having each district or school work on the
problem alone. External assessments could be developed for common knowledge and
skill elements, to lower the burden on local schools and districts. One state that has been
working along these lines is Iowa. In that state, education, business, and political leaders
developed a comprehensive model for teacher performance evaluation, licensing, and
compensation (Iowa Department of Education, 2000). Yet the ability of local
organizations to customize a state model should be retained, in order to maximize the
potential for local acceptance and to recognize that, at this early stage, no one knowledge
and skill-based pay model has emerged as 'best practice'.
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Appendix
Brief Descriptions of the Seven Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay (KSBP) Case Sites
Cincinnati
The Cincinnati Public School district is the State of Ohio's third largest, enrolling about
48000 students in 78 schools. The student population is 71% African-American, the rest
white or other. About 65% are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. A relatively large
proportion of Cincinnati's school-age children attend private schools, which, given the
state's school funding system and laws requiring referenda for increases in school
spending, has faced the district with pressures to reduce costs and improve student
achievement. Average per- pupil spending was about $8,000 in 1998-99. The average
teacher base salary was about $44,000. Fifty-one percent of the district's 3,000 teachers
have Master's degrees and the average level of teaching experience is 15 years. The
district has a seven-person elected school board on which the members serve staggered
four year terms. Teachers are represented by a local American Federation of Teachers
affiliate. CPS began developing its knowldge and skill-based pay program in 1996 with
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a commitment to redesign the teacher evaluation system. The new evaluation system,
which will be the foundation for the KSBP program, was field-tested in the 1999-2000
school year and will be used in the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years before the
pay component. The pay component has been fully designed and was included in the
collective bargaining agreement approved by the Board and the local Federation of
Teachers in the Spring of 2000. In 2003-2004, the pay component will be added unless a
supermajority of teachers vote to reject the program in May of 2003. In addition to the
knowledge and skill-based pay structure, a group bonus of $1,400 is to be paid to all
teachers in schools that meet school-wide goals for improving student achievement.
Coventry
The Coventry, Rhode Island district is one of the fastest growing suburban districts in
the Northeast. It serves 5,600 students in 9 schools. The student population is 98% white
and 2% minority. About 22 % are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. Student
population has been growing moderately. Average per-pupil spending was $7,400 in
1997- 98, and the average teacher base salary was about $50,00. About 80% of the
district's 351 teachers have Master's degrees and the distribution of teaching experience
is bimodal, with about 60% very long service and 40% 5 or fewer years. Teachers are
represented by a local American Federation of Teachers affiliate. Coventry began
developing its new pay system in 1995, when the association proposed recognition of
National Board certification. The initial element of the program, a bonus for NBPTS
certification, was implemented in 1996. Additional pay for knowledge and skill elements
were implemented for the 2000-2001 school year.
Douglas County
The Douglas County, Colorado school district, located in a fast- growing area between
Denver and Colorado Springs, enrolls more than 32,000 students in 49 schools.
(Thirty-two schools were opened since 1989.) The student population is 91% white, 4%
Hispanic, and 5% other. About 2% are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. Average
per- pupil spending was $7.817 in 1996-97, and the average teacher base salary about
$39,680 in 1998. The average level of teaching experience is about 8 years. Teachers are
represented by a local American Federation of Teachers affiliate. The process of
developing the new pay system began in the 1991-92 school year, but the major design
activities took place from July 1993 to the beginning of the 94-95 school year. The
current plan was first implemented during the 1994-95 school year and has continued
with minor modification since. Besides knowledge and skill elements, it also includes a
modification of the traditional pay schedule that makes seniority pay progression
dependent on satisfactory performance evaluation, a school group bonus program, and
added pay for additional school-or district-level responsibilities.
Limon
The Limon, Colorado district serves 660 students in two schools. Located in a rural area,
the district's students are 91% white, 5.6% Hispanic, and 3.4% other. About 34% are
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. The size of the student population is now stable
after an brief period of increase in the early 90's. Average per-pupil spending was $5,643
in 1996-97, and the average teacher base salary was $27,900 in 1998. 20% of the 44
teachers have Master's degrees, and the average level of teaching experience is about 10
years. Teachers are represented by a local association affiliated with the National
37 of 40
Education Association, but only a minority of teachers pay state and local dues, and
collective bargaining is essentially informal, with no formal contract negotiated. Pay
innovation began in 1994-95, with the development of a link between pay increases and
teacher performance evaluations. The traditional step and lane schedule was eliminated
in favor of merit pay, which was based on principal evaluation in accordance with the
state evaluation standards. The current plan was introduced for the 1998-99 school year.
In addition to knowledge and skill-based pay, the pay system also the potential for a
$400 increase if building-level goals are met and a $400 increase for achieving unit or
grade-level goals.
Manitowoc
The Manitowoc, Wisconsin school district is located in a community of 33,000 in the
eastern part of the state. It serves almost 6,000 students in 5 schools. The student
population is 86% white and 14% minority. Student population growth has leveled off
and is expected to decline. About 1% are eligible for free or reduced price lunch.
Average per-pupil spending is about $7,692, and the average teacher base salary about $
37,240. Relatively few of the district's 420 teachers have Master's degrees, but the
average level of teaching experience is relatively high. Teachers are represented by a
local National Education Association affiliate. Manitowoc began developing the new
pay system in early 1999, as part of negotiations for the 1999-2001 teacher contract. The
system went into effect for the 2000-2001 school year.
Robbinsdale
The Robbinsdale, Minnesota school district is located in a suburban area outside
Minneapolis-Saint Paul. It serves approximately 14,000 students, of who 20% are
nonwhite and 22 are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. (It should be noted,
however, that within the district, the percentage eligible for free or reduced price lunch
varies widely by school, from 15 to 80%.) The student population is slowly increasing.
Average per-pupil spending is about $8,555, and the average teacher base salary about $
44,950. 48% of the 900 teachers have Master's degrees and the average level of teaching
experience is 14 years. Teachers are represented by a local American Federation of
Teachers affiliate. The process of developing a new pay system began in 1994. Though
the negotiation process, an outline of a plan was developed as part of the 1995-97
collective bargaining agreement, but the tentative contract was rejected by the
membership. A revised program structure was approved as part of the 1997-2000
contract. The district is still working to develop the components, and the program has
not yet gone into effect.
Vaughn
Vaughn Next Century Learning Center is a public charter school in San Fernando,
California. Previously a public school in the Los Angeles Unified School Distinct, the
school converted to charter status in July of 1993, It currently serves about 1,200
students in pre-K through grade 5. The student population is 94% Hispanic and 5.5%
African American, and .5% other. Only 13% of the students are considered to be English
proficient. About 98% are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. The average teacher
base salary was $42,000 in 1999-2000. The average level of teaching experience is 7
years. Vaughn is governed by three staff/parent committees, with a special council
existing to oversee and resolve disputes between the three committees. Teachers as a
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group are not represented at this time, though some individual teachers are members of
the American Federation of Teachers or National Education Association. The school
began developing its KSBP program during the 1997-98 school year. An initial
implementation for new teachers and volunteers was done in the 1998-99 school year.
During that year, 19 of the 50+ teachers participated in the program. An improved
version was put into place, again for new teachers and volunteers, for the 1999-2000
school year, during which 37 of the classroom teachers participated. The program was
continued during the 2000-2001 school year. Vaughn's knowledge and skill-based pay is
part of a complete redesign of pay system that also included pay for additional duties and
a group bonus of $1,500 for all teachers if the school meets the student achievement
goals in the charter. In addition, the school is eligible for a state program that provides
bonuses to teachers in schools that meet state-set goals for improving student
achievement.
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